STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TÜRKIYE IN THE EXPORT ROUTES OF AZERBAIJANI ENERGY RESOURCES TO GLOBAL MARKET

Abstract. In this article have been considered the role of Türkiye in bringing Azerbaijan's energy resources to the world market. Of the 203.2-257.7 billion barrels of oil reserves in the Caspian Basin, Azerbaijan accounts 39-72 billion barrels. The volume of proven gas reserves in the Caspian region is 232 trillion cubic meters, of which Azerbaijan accounts for 30 trillion cubic meters.

The volume of gas in the Shah Deniz field only is estimated at 1.4 trillion cubic meters. The territory of Türkiye is of exceptional importance for placing these hydrocarbon reserves on the world market.

Thus, in the north-south direction, the Balkans and the Caucasus, two important land transition regions connecting the central part of Eurasia with the warm seas and the African mainland, and the straits, which are also a maritime transition region, cross in Turkey and connect these regions with the Middle East and the Caspian region, which are geo-economic centers of natural resources. In the east-west direction, the Anatolian Peninsula forming the most important link in the strategic peninsular region surrounding the Eurasian mainland. Türkiye is situated in a favorable geographical position between regions rich in energy resources and economically developed regions. In terms of its geographical and geostrategic position, Türkiye plays the role of an energy corridor between countries rich in hydrocarbon resources and developed countries that are in demand for these resources.

This position is also important for the brotherly Turkic states, especially Azerbaijan. Türkiye is currently implementing important transport projects to ensure the transportation of Azerbaijani energy resources to world markets and at the same time to meet its own energy needs.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, hydrocarbon reserves, Türkiye, geostrategic position, energy policy, energy demand.

Introduction

In geopolitical terms, Türkiye is located in the central part of the transition points and battlefields of land and maritime centers of power in the east-west and north-south directions. In the north-south direction, the Balkans and the Caucasus, which are two important land transitional regions connecting the central part of Eurasia to the warm seas and the African mainland, and the straits, which are also a maritime transitional region, are crossed in Türkiye and connect these regions to the Middle East and the Caspian region, which are centers of geo-economic natural resources. In the east-west direction, the Anatolian Peninsula stands for the most important ring of the strategic peninsular region surrounding the Eurasian mainland.

These geopolitical features have always functioned as a determining factor in the historical destiny of the region. For this reason, the Anatolian Peninsula has historically been of significant importance as a center of political power and continues to maintain this position. This region is one of the most important geopolitical and geo-economic regions of the world.

Thus, this region is located on either side of the transport network connecting the most developed regions of Eurasia, particularly those rich in natural resources, primarily hydrocarbons, and the most developed regions of the West with the furthest points of the East in the most direct line and therefore must inevitably emerge.

The energy strategy of the Turkish Republic has been formed considering factors such as economic development and economic growth, security of energy supply, preservation of sustainable ecological balance and international relations. The main objective of Türkiye's energy policy has been defined as the realization of a sustainable, high quality, stable, secure and affordable energy supply.

Türkiye's energy policy is aimed at ensuring that the country's energy needs are met in a sustainable, reliable and secure manner. Since the country's hydrocarbon reserves are scarce, they cover only a small part of Türkiye's total needs. Türkiye's annual demand for oil is about 45 million tons and for gas almost 60 billion cubic meters. The internal production can only meet 15-20 per cent of this volume. Other part is met by neighboring and regional states (Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, Iraq, etc.) that are rich in these resources. Of these states, only Azerbaijan provides reliable and sustainable supplies, and their volume is constantly growing. Supplies from Iraq, Iran and Russia cannot be reliable, sustainable, and secure due to regional wars (war and threat of terrorism in Iraq, Russian Ukrainian war, etc.), various embargoes and supply problems (embargoes against Russia and Iran and various disagreements with both states, etc.) at various times.

These reasons increase the significance of the energy co-operation policy with Azerbaijan and other Caspian Turkic states. The fact that Azerbaijan has won the war with Armenia, returned the occupied territories, further expanded relations with European states in the energy sector and is pursuing a policy of diversification also guarantees the successful completion of Türkiye's policy in this direction.

1. The geostrategic position and interests of Türkiye.

In geopolitical terms, Türkiye is located in the central part of the transition points and on the battlefield of land and maritime centers of power in the east-west and north-south directions.

In the north-south direction, the Balkans and the Caucasus, which are two important land transition regions connecting the central part of Eurasia to the warm seas and the African mainland, and the straits, which are also a maritime transition region, are crossed in Türkiye and connect these regions to the Middle East and the Caspian region, which are geo-economic natural resource centers. In the east-west direction, the Anatolian Peninsula represents the most important part of the strategic peninsular region surrounding the Eurasian mainland.

These geopolitical features have always played a determining factor in the historical destiny of the region. Due to this reason, the Anatolian Peninsula has historically been of significant importance as a center of political power and continues to maintain this position. The region where Türkiye is situated lies next to, as well as being a part of, the region called the ‘Eurasian Balkans’ by Z. Brzezinski. According to him [5, p.187], in Europe the word ‘Balkans’ causes associations with ethnic conflicts and regional struggle of powerful superpowers.

Eurasia has its own ‘Balkans’ as well, but the ‘Eurasian Balkans’ are much larger in area, more densely populated and ethnically diverse. They include Southeast Europe, parts of Central Asia and South Asia, the Persian Gulf region, and the Middle East. This region is seen to be one of the most significant geopolitical and geo-economic regions of the world. Indeed, this region lies on both sides of a transport network rich in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, and linking the most developed regions of Eurasia by the most direct route to the furthest points of the East, and therefore it is inevitable that it should emerge.

Abdullah Gül, who was the Foreign Minister of the Justice and Development Party of Türkiye from 2003 to 2007, re-emphasized the importance of Türkiye in the region where it is located in his speech to the Istanbul Assembly of the Industrial Organization on 28 July 2004:

“In the more than a year and a half since our government came to power, significant changes both internationally and in our immediate environment have resulted to a tense and dynamic foreign policy agenda for our country.

Our country, located at a strategic crossroads where different geographies and regions intersect, with considerable political experience, human capacity, military power and economic potential, is not a spectator of events in the face of the changes in our environment, but pursues an active and guiding policy.... These changes have given a concrete and effective vision of the added value that Türkiye brings as a bridge to strategic cooperation between Eastern and Western cultures due to its geographical location and the multilateral active foreign policy pursued by our country, which defines its interests within the broad framework of regional and even international cooperation, going beyond slogans in the international arena” [10, pp. 90-91].

The collapse of the Soviet empire called the USSR in the 1990s completed the formation of the bipolar world that emerged after World War II and the Cold War period. This situation also created a large gap in the geopolitical and geo-economic position of the world. The increasing significance of geopolitics in the post-Cold War period and its revitalization are directly related to these ruptures.

This geopolitical rupture has closely interested Türkiye, found on the Anatolian Peninsula and one of the most important links in the region, and has inevitably affected its major international and regional strategic decisions. The conventional tactical struggles and geopolitical balances brought to the forefront by this struggle are once again coming to the fore with new elements in the dynamic conditions of the post-Cold War period founded on the balance of power. This causes geopolitics, which was thought to have lost its importance with the advent of nuclear technology, to have a stronger influence once again on international relations and balances. The importance of geopolitics is increasing in parallel with the deepening interdependence between international balances and the regional spheres of impact [6, pp. 114-115].

A new system of international relations was formed in the world with the cancellation of the bipolar world and the end of the Cold War.

Thus, at the end of the 1990s, the system of international relations entered a new stage both in its composition and character.

This system, called the “new world order, is characterized by competition and a “war for influence” between the great powers for control over strategically important regions of the world with rich hydrocarbon resources. At the same time, the opinion of the regions for which the struggle is being waged is not even considered. In such a situation, the power and sovereignty of national states are decreasing, and the place of national states in the system of international relations is gradually weakening [2, p. 23].

What are the consequences of this situation for Türkiye's geopolitical position and its place in the system of international relations? First of all, we should note that Türkiye is a member of the UN, OSCE and many other international organizations. It is also one of the states with the best chances to become a member of the EU. At the same time, it is an associate member of the Western European Union. On the other hand, Türkiye, along with Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian republics, occupies a key place in various regional organizations and associations, including the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Türkiye plays a leading role in the Euro-Mediterranean Organization and participates in all related activities. On the third hand, it is an undeniable fact that Türkiye plays a significant role in preventing a significant increase in instability in the “Eurasian Balkans” and potentially bringing the situation closer to an explosive point. Currently, the settlement of millions of refugees and immigrants from the Near and Middle East in the country and the solution of their social problems are vital issues for Europe.

Additionally, Türkiye has been a member of NATO since 1952. Relations with the EU also began in the 1960s. Thus, Türkiye has been cooperating with the EU since 1963 and has been pursuing policies aimed at integration into Europe for decades. To have Türkiye accepted into the EU after some time, the U.S. should use its influence in Europe and treat Türkiye like any other European country. Overall, regular consultations with the country on the future of Asia could lead to a further strengthening of the strategic partnership with the US. “By continuing to regard herself as an outcast in the Europe she seeks to join, Turkey will become more Islamized, will vote against NATO expansion, to everyone's upset, and is unlikely to cooperate with the West in stabilizing Soviet Central Asia and incorporating it into the global community.” [5, 309].

The geopolitical position of Türkiye is of significant importance in this process. In particular, the country has a leading role in security issues. Thus, Türkiye is a country that is the center of stability at the Black Sea-Mediterranean junction, a balancer of Russian policy in the Caucasus, a protective shield against religious fundamentalism and the southern wing of NATO [16, p. 292]. Z. Brzezinski, speaking about the importance of Türkiye for the U.S. in the future, states: “To ensure stability in the countries located in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and to strengthen their independence, the United States must be careful not to encourage Türkiye to distance itself, and must explore opportunities to improve U.S.-Iranian relations” [5, 309]. [5, 309]. The United States could also use Türkiye's influence in the region to normalize relations with Iran. Overall, it is not in the American interest to maintain hostility in U.S.-Iranian relations forever.

Any future rapprochement, stabilization of Iran's regional sphere is undoubtedly in the strategic interests not just for both parties, but also for the entire region. Türkiye's role in this issue is undeniable. The U.S. abandoning its objections to Türkiye's closer economic cooperation with Iran, especially in the construction of new oil pipelines, and the development of other relations between Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan would better serve America's long-term interests in Eurasia [5, 310].

Historically, Türkiye has played a regulatory role outside the region, being a military, political, and socioeconomic power in a wide geography from the Balkans to China and from Morocco to Iran. Moreover, Türkiye has been effectively positioned to ensure lasting peace, balance, and prosperity in Eurasia and abroad by establishing bilateral and multilateral relations with the Balkan countries, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the countries of the Mediterranean basin.

Türkiye's geopolitics should also be subjected to a new analysis in the modern system of international relations called the New World Order, where the Cold War and its parameters have been abolished. Türkiye's former foreign minister and prime minister A. Davutoglu made this proposal also notes that “this role should be evaluated by overcoming the strategy of defending the status quo of the past. In an era where international and regional balances are dynamically shifting, using geopolitics to defend the status quo is gradually rendering geopolitical advantages unusable. Geopolitical position is not a value that can be left alone. A geopolitical position becomes valuable when it becomes a means of influencing the foreign policy strategy that is put forward in accordance with that position. In this sense, we must reanalyze the place of Türkiye's geopolitics within the framework of foreign policy strategy and give it a new meaning in the international environment” [6, с.116].

Although the Turkish Republic lacks rich hydrocarbon deposits, it is strategically located in an advantageous position surrounded by regions rich in these resources (Russia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Basin, Iran, Iraq and other countries in the Near and Middle East, etc.). Thus, Türkiye is located in a region where 71.8 % of the world's proven gas reserves and 72.7 % of oil reserves are concentrated. Due to this reason, Türkiye is playing the corridor role, being a natural bridge between the countries rich in natural resources and the markets where their sale is organized and having a say in determining the sources and the corridor, it comes to the fore as an important country in ensuring energy security [21. p.2]. Her position as a “golden bridge” connecting important geographical points such as Europe and Asia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, and from there to the world's oceans, enhances her geostrategic role.

2. The energy policy of Türkiye

As with all countries in the world, energy resources, and especially hydrocarbon resources, are of strategic importance in Türkiye. Not accidentally, this issue was also reflected in the election manifesto put forward by the Justice and Development Party, which is currently in power in Türkiye, in the 2002 elections, even before it came to power. In the part of the manifesto entitled “Cheap and Reliable Energy”, energy policy was seen as “one of the most important means of creating sustainable development and an internationally competitive economy” [1, p.57]. [1, с.57]. In the manifesto, it criticized the energy policies of previous governments and stated that “as a result of their recent policies, the energy sector has become an urgent and intractable problem for Türkiye”.

It also stated that contracts and agreements incompatible with the country's strategic growth prospects are placing an increasing financial burden on Türkiye. This financial burden is also being transferred to consumers through high product prices and taxes. All of this, by diverting consumers away from energy consumption, leads to lower growth rates, reduces the competitiveness of domestic industry and hinders the inflow of foreign investment. The declaration emphasizes that the basis of the energy policy of the Justice and Development Party is to provide cheap and reliable energy, to form a competitive energy market, to reduce the burden on the budgets of citizens, to protect the environment and human health, and to realize these goals the following tasks are set: [1, p.58].

- Special attention will be given to renewable and alternative energy sources,

- Clean energy sources and conversion technologies will be utilized for environmental protection,

- Productivity in production, transportation, supply and services will be improved,

- The opportunities for our country to become a terminal for the delivery of oil and natural gas from our neighbors to world markets will be assessed, and we will become a regional energy powerhouse.

The position of Türkiye between regions rich in energy resources and economically developed regions with high energy needs is one of the indicators of its important geostrategic and geopolitical position. This position has not left the issue of defining the strategic goals of the Turkish Republic unattended. It should be noted that even at the time of coming to power, the Justice and Development Party also provided certain policies to achieve these goals. Initially, the energy demand, which was 126.9 billion kilowatt hours in 2001, was to reach 270 billion kilowatt hours in 2010.

The energy strategy of the Turkish Republic has been formulated considering the factors such as economic development and economic growth, security of energy supply, preservation of ecological balance and international relations. The realization of sustainable, high-quality, stable, secure and affordable energy supply has been defined as the main goal of the energy policy of Türkiye [15, p.112]. The achievement of this goal is directly related to the overall economic development of Türkiye. Despite the many negative events that have occurred recently (pandemic, earthquake, etc.), Türkiye has made considerable progress in the main economic indicators. If we focus only on the gross internal product, Türkiye showed the highest growth rate among the G-20 countries in 2021, increasing by 11%. Overall, Türkiye's average annual growth rate between 2002 and 2020 was 5.2%. National income, which was $238 billion in 2002, has tripled during this period, reaching $803 billion in 2021. Exports, which amounted to 36 billion dollars in 2002, reached a record level of 225 billion dollars in 2021 [11, p. 7]. In general, the main objective of the economic policy provided for in the medium-term financial planning for 2021-2023 is to maintain and develop the achievements obtained under the New Economic Programs, to restore the internal and external balance, to implement economic changes and transformations based on production, export and financial stability by taking advantage of economic opportunities determined by the new norms emerging in the world economy, with the implementation of strategic reforms that should be on the basis of the New Economic Programs and the New Economic Agenda.

Within the framework of the realization of the above-mentioned goals, the issue of hydrocarbon resources development was also included in the state capital investment policy. According to this policy, it was proposed to accelerate the work on oil and natural gas exploration, as well as to put into operation as soon as possible and start economically profitable use of the Sakarya natural gas field discovered in the Black Sea [11, p. 8].

Overall, the main objectives of Türkiye's energy strategy are to achieve the following indicators at a prominent level:      

1. Energy diversification (diversification)
2. Security of energy supply
3. Import and trade of energy resources, regional and international cooperation in this field
4. Renewable energy sources
5. Efficiency of energy consumption

The work towards achieving the above-mentioned goals is also included in Türkiye's Eleventh Development Plan 2019-2023 (Goals and Policies 491, 492 and 493). According to these goals [15, p.113]:

- Energy production from renewable energy sources will be increased, necessary planning and investments will be made to ensure the safe integration of renewable energy production into the grid (through appropriate models, the increased use of renewable sources in electricity production, will be ensured the integration of renewable energy production facilities into the grid and will be implemented appropriate technical assistance projects, etc.).

- More efficient and self-generating buildings will be widespread (will be supported an energy efficiency of existing buildings, will be established a national certification system for green buildings, will be implemented a project to improve the energy efficiency of public buildings, etc.).

- Electricity networks and systems will be strengthened and made more flexible (technical and non-technical electricity losses will be reduced, with outreach, incentives and sanctions to reduce non-technical losses, increased use of smart meters and remote reading systems, and increased inspections).

3. The Energy Corridor Issue in Türkiye's Foreign Policy.

Regardless of how hard Türkiye has tried to ensure its energy security through internal energy sources, it has faced a number of problems and ensuring it in the full sense of the word has not been possible. The major reason for this, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, is the lack of sufficient oil and gas deposits. The steps taken in this direction have not yet led to the discovery of sources in sufficient quantities to fully cover the country's energy supply. At the same time, Türkiye's geographical location plays a significant role in eliminating this disadvantage. Thus, the territory of the Turkish Republic has the opportunity to expand relations with Russia, the Caucasus and through it the Caspian Sea basin, as well as Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Mediterranean Sea and the World Ocean. Moreover, it should be noted that most of the countries that surround Türkiye are rich in oil and natural gas reserves. Therefore, Türkiye should regulate its relations with these countries to ensure a sustainable and secure energy supply and consider this issue in any measures.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire in the early 1990s and the establishment of independent states from it by new republics, including Turkic nations, also had an impact on re-forming Türkiye's foreign policy in this direction. In the early 1990s, Türkiye began to pursue an active policy with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, starting from the second half of the 1990s, this policy became balanced.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the rapidly growing Turkish economy has led to an increasing demand for energy, and the availability of cheap and secure energy sources has become one of the most important foreign policy issues. As a result of these two events, both internally and regionally, energy policy became the most important foreign policy issue of Türkiye in the 2000s. To supplement these two issues, the emergence of the Caspian Sea basin, particularly in the field of natural gas, as an alternative energy source after the end of the Cold War turned Russia and the Caucasus into one of the most key areas of interest for Turkish foreign policy. In other words, the Justice and Development Party government, aiming to turn Türkiye into an energy terminal of the region and provide cheap and secure energy to its developing economy, signed several energy agreements with its neighbors and regional countries during this period.

Table 1.

Türkiye's natural gas purchase contracts (1986-2013)

Source: [17]

Consequently, Türkiye's active energy policy has brought Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran to the top of its foreign policy programme. During this period, three important projects were realized in the context of energy policy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became operational in 2006 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline in 2001 as a result of the process initiated by the ‘AGREEMENT OF THE AGE’ signed in 1994. The Blue Stream project, agreed in 1998 to bring Russian natural gas to Türkiye, was completed in 2005. These three energy lines have created strong relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, and have largely met Türkiye's growing energy demands. The result of all this was that the total volume of natural gas supplied to Türkiye increased from 17 billion cubic meters in 2002 to 38 billion cubic meters in 2008, in 2018 it increased up to 50 billion cubic meters and in 2022 it increased up to 55 billion cubic meters [19, p.12].

Turkmenistan is one of the main countries targeted by Türkiye for energy supplies. This Turkic-speaking country, located in the Caspian Sea basin, is also characterized by a wealth of energy resources. The first relations with Turkmenistan in this field were intensified after its independence in 1991. From the first years of independence, it was planned the transportation of Turkmen natural gas to Türkiye. Therefore, all possible pipeline routes from Turkmenistan to Türkiye were considered. Three options for a pipeline route from Turkmenistan to Türkiye (or to the West) were considered. The first route runs from the Russian border to Türkiye in the north; the second route involves transportation across the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan; the third route is a pipeline from the Iranian border to the south.

The idea of transportation of Turkmen gas to Türkiye via Iran was first suggested by Iran. In January 1995, it was planned to build a pipeline through Iran to transport and sell Turkmen gas to Türkiye and Europe. Iran and Türkiye supported this project. In February 1995, the Interstate Oil and Natural Gas Export Council established an international joint stock company, the ‘Turkmen Transcontinental Pipeline’ (TTP).

TTP will undertake the planning, financing, construction and operation of the new pipeline. The Interstate Council, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank and the Japan Overseas Investment Association had indicated their readiness to provide financial resources for the construction of the 1,400-kilometer pipeline. However, when it was clear that the project would not receive international financial support due to US sanctions against Iran, the Turkmen government was compelled to withdraw from the project in 1996 [13, pp. 11-12]. Nevertheless, the National Iranian Oil Company reached an agreement with the Turkmen government on the construction of the Kerbja-Gurdguyu short gas pipeline. The construction of this 200 km long, 8 billion cubic meters of gas per year pipeline was completed in 1997 and it was connected to Iran's national gas network. Part of the natural gas imported to Türkiye from Iran is also supplied from Turkmenistan through this pipeline [8, p. 39]. Even though the idea of transporting Turkmen gas to Türkiye via Georgia had been discussed since 1993, the first step was taken in March 1996, during Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov's visit to Georgia. During the meetings in Georgia, it was announced that Turkmenistan had reached an agreement with Türkiye to purchase 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. It was agreed that the gas pipeline between Georgia and Türkiye would be built by a consortium established by the two countries. After the meetings, the Georgian side stated that it would be sufficient to build a 25-kilometre gas line to the existing gas pipelines. Subsequently, in June of the same year, BOTASH representatives stated that the pipeline to the city of Rustavi in Georgia was sufficient, but that a new pipeline would need to be built to the Turkish border. Finally, Turkmenistan announced that an agreement had been signed in Ankara for the transportation of Turkmen gas to Türkiye via Georgia. According to this agreement, due to the short construction period of the pipeline, 300,000 cubic meters of natural gas per day could be imported to Türkiye via Georgia after one year, in the winter of 1997. Maintenance work on the existing pipeline was to begin within two weeks of the signing of the agreement. The project included the repair of a 250 kilometers pipeline and the construction of a new 25 kilometers pipeline. The total cost of the project was estimated at $150 million. Although this agreement seemed very favorable for all three countries, the parties failed to consider a particularly crucial factor. Since Turkmen gas had to pass through Russian territory to reach Georgia, it had to be included Russia in the agreement. Moreover, the pipelines along which it was to flow were under the control of Gazprom. According to the new project, Turkmen gas will be transported through the Middle Asia-Central Asia pipeline and sent to Türkiye rather than to Georgia and from there to Ukraine. Gazprom, which controlled the main gas pipeline, decided to refuse co-operation with the project prepared by Turkmenistan, Türkiye and Georgia. Instead of this, Russia proposed to build a pipeline to Türkiye via Georgia and Armenia [12, p. 17]. Türkiye did also not accept the latter proposal. As a result, this project was not realized. However, the Turkish energy market attracted Russia's attention, and as a result, the Blue Stream project was signed in December 1997.

As a result of these occurrences, Turkmenistan realized that it was unable to use Gazprom's lines to supply gas to Türkiye and other European countries and considered the idea of building a new pipeline across the Caspian Sea as an alternative to Russia for natural gas exports. In fact, initial agreement on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, which would connect Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea, was reached in April 1998, during a visit of Turkmenistan's President S. Niyazov to the United States. Niyazov's visit to the United States. The project was also attractive for the Azerbaijani side. Thus, in 1996 Azerbaijan signed an agreement to develop the rich Shah Deniz gas field. According to the new project, Turkmen gas was to be transported to Azerbaijan through a pipeline running along the Caspian Sea bottom, and from there, bypassing the territory of Georgia, to Türkiye [12, p. 23].

This project was characterized by its shorter length. In 1998, Russia and Turkmenistan proposed two route options for natural gas sales to Türkiye: one via the Black Sea and the other via the Caspian Sea. On 21 May 1999, the Turkmen government and BOTASH signed an agreement on the sale and purchase of 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year for a 30-year period. Furthermore, the parties also prepared projects for the construction of a gas pipeline with a total capacity of 30 billion cubic meters, which will provide 14 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to be sold to Europe via the Caspian Sea. In June 1999, the cost of the project was estimated by a group of countries supporting the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project at $2-2.5 billion, and it was estimated that the pipeline could be completed by 2002. The same year in November, high-level officials from Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the United States met in Ankara to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline [12, p. 23]. The presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed agreements on oil and gas pipeline projects connecting the Caspian Sea to Türkiye at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999. However, Russia quickly reacted negatively to these developments. At the same time, Turkmenistan's position also hindered progress on this issue. Thus, at the initial stage of negotiations on the status of the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan demonstrated an ambiguous position. On the one hand, it declared the importance of dividing the Caspian Sea into national sectors, and on the other hand, it supported the idea of adopting the principle of “joint use of the sea” (condominium) as a basis. Turkmenistan's claims to Azerbaijan for some fields in the Caspian Sea are also one of the main sources of tension in determining the status of the Caspian Sea. It should be noted that as early as the summer of 1997 at the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held in Ashgabat, the leadership of Turkmenistan presented to the Azerbaijani side a map of “delimitation of maritime borders”, allegedly left over from the Soviet times, trying to prove that the Azeri and Chirag fields are in the sector of Turkmenistan, not Azerbaijan, and declared its readiness to give up its claims to these fields for certain compensations. The major claim was related to the “Kapaz” field, which the Turkmen call “Sardar”. It is worth noting that, according to rough estimates, the reserves of oil in this field amount more than 80 million tons. The signing of the agreement on the exploitation of “Kapaz” between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan and the Russian companies “Lukoil” and “Rosneft” in the summer of 1997 caused a sharp reaction from the then official Ashgabat [9, p. 8-13]. Even though the leadership of both countries took a series of steps to resolve the problem between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the negotiations have not yielded any results yet.

In December 1997, at the meeting of the presidents of the two countries in Tehran, a decision was made to establish a bilateral commission to determine the borders. A special expert group for negotiations with Turkmenistan was established by a decree of President Heydar Aliyev on January 16, 1998, and a similar decree was signed by Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov on January 18. The first meeting of the expert group was held in Ashgabat on February 5, 1998. However, neither the Ashgabat meeting nor the negotiations held in Baku on March 30 produced serious results. Negotiations between the two countries in subsequent years also failed to clarify the fate of “Kapaz”. While meetings and negotiations between Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev and Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in 2007-2009 brought some constructive developments to relations, there are still no points of contact between the two countries on the Caspian Sea (9).

The fact that Russia and Kazakhstan also function as unofficial allies of Azerbaijan in this dispute restricts Ashgabat's room for maneuver. In general, the access of Turkmenistan's gas reserves to the world market in the current situation does not look extremely attractive for Azerbaijan.

Hence, Azerbaijan is more interested in transportation of its natural resources to the world market and ensuring security of energy supply to Europe.

The latest agreements even provide for an increase of this volume. In this sense, Turkmen gas is also competitive for Azerbaijan. Therefore, the benefit of the Azerbaijani side from the transportation of Turkmen gas is limited only to receiving certain transit payments from it.

Regarding the status of the Caspian Sea, the bilateral agreements signed on this issue with Russia and Kazakhstan have had a positive impact on this process, and therefore, if Turkmenistan and Iran want to make any progress, they must give up their unrealistic claims in accordance with the requirements of international law. Turkmenistan is currently reassessing relations with Azerbaijan, and practical steps are being taken to form a new level of relations on a mutually beneficial basis.

Precisely as a result of these steps, Turkmenistan has started to evaluate the possibilities of transporting its rich hydrocarbon resources to European markets via Azerbaijan. More transportation of natural resources in the future is underway and both sides have expressed their interest in this issue at the level of heads of state.

Thus, as shown above, the Turkish Republic uses various diplomatic steps, reciprocal multilateral, and bilateral relations, as well as projects culminating in the signing of agreements, to realize its goal of securing sustainable and secure energy supplies from various countries.

Agreements signed with neighboring and regional states such as Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, etc., that are wealthy in energy resources, have gained significant importance in this regard. The agreements signed with these states will enable Türkiye to play the role of an energy corridor that allows it not only to secure its own supply, but also to export energy products to Europe in the near future.

Conclusion

In general, from the foregoing, a conclusion can be made that Türkiye occupies a favorable geographical position between regions rich in energy resources and economically developed regions.

This position has significantly increased its geopolitical and geo-economic importance. At the same time, the Turkish economy has also significantly developed recently, a development that naturally leads to an increase in energy demand. For these reasons, Türkiye's geo-economic and geopolitical position is significant, both in terms of delivering these resources to developed and high-demand European countries and in meeting the growing needs of its own developing industry in a sustainable, integrated, and secure manner. Türkiye's energy policy has been defined towards meeting the country's energy needs in a sustainable, reliable, and secure manner. As the country's hydrocarbon reserves are scarce, they provide only a small part of Türkiye's total needs.

Türkiye's annual demand for oil is about 45 million tons and for gas about 60 billion cubic meters. Internal production can meet only 15-20 percent of this volume. Other resources are supplied by neighboring and regional states (Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, Iraq, etc.) that are wealthy in these resources.

Of these states, only Azerbaijan provides reliable and stable supplies, and their volume is constantly increasing.

Thus, Türkiye's energy policy, which started in the 1990s, aims at making progress in this field and ensuring continuous and secure supplies from various countries with energy sources. To achieve this goal are utilized various diplomatic steps, reciprocal multilateral and bilateral relations, and projects culminating in the signing of agreements. Among these countries, agreements signed with neighboring and regional states such as Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, etc., that are plentiful in these energy sources, have gained importance.

The agreements signed with these states will allow Türkiye not only to secure its own supplies, but also to play the role of an energy corridor creating conditions for exporting energy products to Europe in the near future.