THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS BY FOREING COURTS

The historical process of globalisation and the deepening of inter-state cooperation in the economic, political, cultural and other spheres of public life has naturally extended to the legal system, including the administration of justice. In view of the expansion of international cooperation, issues relating to the legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of court judgments of the Republic of Belarus abroad have taken on exceptional significance. The possibility of recognising and enforcing court judgments handed down by the courts of the Republic of Belarus on the territory of foreign states depends directly on the nature of the legal relations between the countries. Generally speaking, the recognition of foreign court judgments constitutes a procedural act whereby a competent court of one state affirms the legal force of a judgment delivered by a court of another state. This procedure confers legal force upon a foreign judicial decision for its subsequent enforcement on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, in strict accordance with the provisions of national legislation or international treaties. In international practice, there are two ways to carry out this process. The first and most commonly used method is the existence of a bilateral or multilateral international treaty on legal assistance. If, however, no such agreement exists between the Republic of Belarus and a foreign state, the principle of reciprocity becomes the only possible means of enforcing a Belarusian court judgement abroad.

 The essence of the principle of reciprocity lies in granting foreign natural and legal persons certain rights and privileges within its territory, provided that its own natural and legal persons enjoy similar rights and privileges in that foreign state [2, p. 21]. The main source of reciprocity is national legislation. The principle of reciprocity is currently enshrined in Part 1 of Article 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Belarus (hereinafter referred to as the CCP): decisions of foreign courts are recognised and enforced within the territory of the Republic of Belarus by a court of the Republic of Belarus if their recognition and enforcement are provided for by the legislation or international treaties of the Republic of Belarus, or on the basis of reciprocity [1]. Although the provisions of Article 527 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Belarus are, in their wording, directed at the procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments, in the doctrine of international civil procedure this institution is traditionally examined in a bilateral context. This legal symmetry stems from the principle of international reciprocity, which refers to a set of specific rules governing the conduct of states engaged in international relations. This principle is applied either on the basis of reciprocity or at the discretion of a particular state; that is to say, it is not legally binding [2, p. 22].

When analysing the mechanism for the recognition of foreign court judgments, it is worth noting the principle of state sovereignty. By virtue of this principle, the jurisdictional powers of national enforcement authorities are limited to the territorial boundaries of a particular state. As early as 1909, T.M. Yablochkov wrote that ‘orders issued by a sovereign authority have no force on foreign territory; its authority ceases at the state’s border’[3]. Consequently, any procedural decision is, by default, enforceable only within the territory of the state of origin. The automatic extension of the enforceability of a judicial decision to the territory of a foreign state is not permissible. This territorial limitation necessitates the legalisation of a foreign decision; as there is no single global code in international law, this procedure is enshrined in the national procedural legislation of each individual country.

 If we examine the mechanism for the recognition of foreign court judgments in the Republic of Belarus, it follows from the provisions of Chapter 51 of the Civil Procedure Code that the procedure for the legalisation of a foreign court or arbitration award is strictly declaratory in nature and is carried out by progressing sequentially through several procedural stages. At the first stage, the interested party must initiate the exequatur procedure by submitting a duly completed application, whilst strictly observing the rules of exclusive territorial jurisdiction: documents are submitted to the competent court of the Republic of Belarus at the debtor’s place of residence or registered office, or, in the absence of such, at the location of their assets. Upon receipt, a petition submitted by a foreign entity is subject to a full review to determine the grounds for recognising and enforcing the decision of a foreign court or for refusing to accept it. In carrying out this assessment, the judge takes the following factors into account: firstly, the relations between the countries – whether the countries are friendly towards the Republic of Belarus, whether there are any open conflicts between them – and a check is also carried out on the reciprocity of the other state, that is, whether that state recognises and enforces the decisions of the courts of the Republic of Belarus. The importance of the second stage lies in compliance with the limitation period; as a general rule, this is three years from the date on which the foreign judgment becomes final, unless otherwise specified by the provisions of international treaties to which the Republic of Belarus is a party; however, it is possible to have the missed deadline reinstated through the courts if there are proven valid reasons. The third stage consists of the actual court proceedings. At this stage, the Belarusian court notifies the parties and carries out a detailed examination to identify grounds for refusing recognition. The procedural culmination of this mechanism is the principle—mandatorily enshrined in national legislation—that a foreign legal act may not be reviewed on its merits; this limits the jurisdiction of the Belarusian court exclusively to verifying formal legality and compliance with public policy, culminating in the issuance of a ruling either granting or refusing recognition. Although this process involves numerous stages, the judge plays the principal role in both the recognition and enforcement of a decision; it is the judge who administers justice, and it is on the basis of the judge’s assessment that it is determined whether a particular act is lawful or not.

Reciprocity should be understood as evidence of legal availability, not as a guarantee that enforcement will succeed in every individual case. Even where reciprocal treatment exists, the requested court may refuse recognition because another statutory ground for refusal has been established. Conversely, the absence of a formal reciprocal statute does not necessarily prove that a Belarusian judgment cannot be recognised abroad. Some jurisdictions use common-law doctrines or concepts of comity that operate independently of reciprocity. The practical role of legal research is therefore central. The existence of a final judgment is only the starting point. The decisive question is which rule of the requested state transforms that judgment into an enforceable legal obligation there.

 For a more detailed examination of the principle of reciprocity, it is worth referring to the legislation of countries within the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. When considering this principle in the United States of America (hereinafter ‘the US’), it is worth noting the absence of uniform legislation across all states. The enforcement of judgments handed down by foreign courts in the US is governed by the laws of the individual states. For example, the state of Minnesota bases its legislation on the Minnesota Statutes, and in accordance with Minnesota Statutes, section 548.27, a certified copy of any foreign judgment may be filed with the office of the court administrator of any district court in this state. The court administrator shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of any district court or the Supreme Court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defences and proceedings for reopening, setting aside or staying as a judgment of a district court or the Supreme Court of this state, and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner [4]. On the basis of this article, we can see significant differences compared with the legislation of the Republic of Belarus. Whilst in the Civil Procedure Code the concept of jurisdiction serves as a key criterion for delineating the respective competences of the various levels of the judicial system and as a means of optimising the judicial workload, in the State of Minnesota, approaches to territorial jurisdiction are discretionary in nature; this means that, where international jurisdiction exists, proceedings for the recognition of a foreign court judgment may be initiated in virtually any district court in the state. It is also worth noting the complete absence of any framework regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In other words, the customary methods of recognition found in the Republic of Belarus—namely, the existence of a bilateral or multilateral international treaty on legal assistance and the principle of reciprocity—are not enshrined in the State of Minnesota. It is irrelevant to the courts of Minnesota whether a foreign state recognises US court judgments in return. A Minnesota court will consider and recognise a foreign judgment if it meets basic legal standards. The mechanism for recognition itself also consists of several stages. The initial step is set out in Minnesota Statutes, section 548.59: ‘If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment’. In other words, the initial stage is not the submission of a foreign court’s judgment, but the filing of a claim. This is followed by a court hearing to determine whether the judgment is eligible for recognition. Thus, an analysis of the approaches to the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments in the Republic of Belarus and the State of Minnesota reveals fundamental differences in the legal systems. Minnesota’s legislation is far more flexible and discretionary in nature. A key advantage of the American legal system in this context is the complete absence of any statutory requirement for the principle of reciprocity; this radically simplifies the process: the state’s courts do not assess whether the foreign state enforces US court judgments in return. Instead, the procedure is limited to verifying basic procedural standards during an open court hearing. The absence of strict territorial limits on jurisdiction in Minnesota allows proceedings to recognise a foreign judgement to be initiated in a court in virtually any county within the state where the debtor or their assets are located.

 Unlike in the State of Minnesota, this principle is enshrined in the State of Arizona. In accordance with the Arizona Revised Statutes (hereinafter ‘A.R.S.’) Section 12 – 3252, the principle of reciprocity is enshrined; however, this section has been supplemented by further conditions compared with the KGS. Based on the A.R.S., the rules on the recognition of foreign court judgments apply to final and enforceable orders for the recovery of monetary sums, with the exception of judgments relating to tax disputes, criminal or administrative fines, and cases arising from family law relationships. At the same time, the state operates under a mandatory principle of reciprocity: the law does not apply to judgments of courts in countries which do not have equivalent reciprocal rules regarding US court judgments. The burden of proving the existence of such reciprocity and the applicability of the statute rests with the claimant; however, the courts of Arizona are expressly authorised to recognise other categories of foreign judgements on the basis of international comity [5]. Unlike in Minnesota, where the courts pay no heed whatsoever to how another country treats US judgments, in Arizona the principle of reciprocity is a key condition. It is interesting to compare Arizona’s approach with the rules in the Republic of Belarus. If there is no treaty, a Belarusian court will also require proof of the principle of reciprocity. However, whilst in Belarus the claimant is required to provide official written documents and the laws of the other country, judges in Arizona take a more lenient view of the situation. This results in three distinct models: Minnesota is completely open and does not require reciprocity; Belarus strictly demands treaties or ironclad guarantees; whilst Arizona has chosen a middle ground — it requires reciprocity, but tests it in practice, not just on paper.

 The legal situation in the USA has shown that what appears to be the same decision can lead to different outcomes. However, when examining the legislation of countries within the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, one should not overlook its most prominent representative – the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the United Kingdom). The legal position in England and Wales demonstrates particularly clearly why reciprocity should not be treated as a single universal doctrine. Foreign judgments may fall within statutory registration regimes, international conventions implemented through domestic procedure, or the common law. CPR Part 74 contains procedural rules concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments and refers to several statutory and treaty frameworks, including the Administration of Justice Act 1920, the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, and the Hague Convention mechanisms. Reciprocity is directly relevant to the statutory regimes that are themselves based on reciprocal enforcement arrangements. Practice Direction 74A, for example, addresses judgments enforceable under the 1920 and 1933 legislation where an agreement for reciprocal enforcement exists between the United Kingdom and the state of origin. Thus, at the statutory level, reciprocity may be an important gateway.

 The position is different under the common law. In the absence of an applicable statutory or treaty regime, the enforcement of an eligible foreign judgment can proceed by an ordinary claim based upon the foreign judgment. The classic authority is Schibsby v Westenholz (1870), while the modern framework was authoritatively discussed by the UK Supreme Court in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46 [8]. The common-law approach does not generally require proof that the foreign state reciprocates by enforcing English judgments. Rubin is important because it confirmed the continuing significance of common-law principles governing the enforcement of foreign judgments and the circumstances in which a foreign judgment may give rise to an enforceable obligation in England. The underlying concept is that, once the conditions required by English private international law are satisfied, the foreign judgment may generate a judgment debt capable of enforcement in England. The English court does not act as an appellate body over the original dispute [8]. Recent authority confirms that this common-law foundation remains relevant. In Drelle v Servis-Terminal LLC [2026] UKSC 29, the Supreme Court again addressed the common-law treatment of a foreign judgment and the principle that a judgment of a competent foreign court can give rise to an obligation to pay the adjudged sum under English law [9]. The decision is particularly useful for a 2026 analysis because it demonstrates that the common-law doctrine is not merely historical background but continues to form part of the modern law of foreign-judgment enforcement.

 For a Belarusian judgment creditor, the consequence is significant. The absence of a general bilateral recognition treaty between Belarus and the United Kingdom does not, by itself, establish that an English court cannot give effect to a Belarusian judgment. Rather, the creditor must determine whether the judgment satisfies the common-law requirements or falls within another applicable statutory or conventional regime. The route is therefore different from the Belarusian statutory model in which reciprocity appears expressly in Article 527. The common-law inquiry includes questions of finality and conclusiveness, the nature of the monetary obligation where a money judgment is being enforced, the jurisdiction of the foreign court under English conflict-of-laws rules, and recognised defences relating to procedural fairness, fraud or public policy [6; 7]. Notice and the opportunity to be heard are particularly important because recognition should not give effect to a judgment produced through fundamental procedural unfairness.

The English example therefore produces a useful three-level comparison. Reciprocity can operate directly within a statutory reciprocal-enforcement regime; a multilateral convention can provide its own recognition rules without requiring an ad hoc reciprocity inquiry; and the common law can enforce eligible foreign judgments without treating reciprocal enforcement by the foreign state as a necessary condition. The same Belarusian judgment may therefore encounter a reciprocity question in one state, a treaty question in another, and a common-law jurisdictional inquiry in England and Wales.

 Comparative practice also shows that the legal basis for recognition of a Belarusian judgment may be specialised rather than a general reciprocity rule. A useful example is provided by the Indiana Court of Appeals decision in Brent Gregory v Tatsiana Gregory (2024), which concerned a Belarusian court order in a child-custody dispute. The Indiana court considered the Belarusian determination within the framework governing recognition of foreign child-custody determinations and concluded that the Belarusian court had properly exercised jurisdiction and that the determination substantially conformed to the applicable statutory requirements [11]. The importance of this example lies in its subject matter. Child-custody recognition is governed by specialised domestic and international rules that differ from ordinary recognition of a foreign money judgment. The case therefore cannot be used to claim that Indiana has adopted a general rule recognising all Belarusian judgments. It does, however, demonstrate that a Belarusian judicial act can be given legal effect in a foreign jurisdiction through a specialised statutory framework rather than through a general bilateral reciprocity analysis. The same methodological lesson applies more broadly. When researching the prospects of recognition, the creditor should first identify the category of judgment: money, civil status, family, property or another subject. The applicable foreign regime may be specialised. Only after that inquiry should general reciprocity or common-law principles be considered. This approach avoids the common error of treating every foreign judgment as if it were subject to the same recognition test.

 Reciprocity is only one element of the broader legal architecture of foreign-judgment recognition. Three related concepts are particularly important: comity, public policy and procedural fairness. Comity describes the willingness of a court or legal system to give appropriate effect to acts of another sovereign's courts in circumstances where doing so is consistent with the interests and standards of the forum. Reciprocity may support comity, but the concepts are not identical. Arizona's statute illustrates this distinction because recognition outside its reciprocal statutory chapter may remain possible on the basis of international comity [5]. Likewise, the English common law does not generally impose reciprocity as a condition for enforcement even though it is built around rules of jurisdiction, finality and fairness [6; 7].

 Public policy performs a different function. It permits the requested court to refuse recognition where giving effect to a particular foreign judgment would be incompatible with fundamental principles of its own legal order. The existence of reciprocal treatment does not eliminate this safeguard. A reciprocal relationship therefore cannot be understood as an unconditional promise of recognition. Recognition mechanisms seek to preserve both finality and basic justice. A foreign judgment is unlikely to receive effect where the defendant was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard or where recognition would validate serious fraud or another fundamental procedural defect. English case law, for example, treats natural justice and fraud as established areas of possible defence to enforcement [6; 7]. The Belarusian Code likewise provides a statutory list of grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement [1]. These safeguards help explain why reciprocity should not be formulated as a simple formula— «Belarus recognises their judgments, therefore they must recognise ours». The legal equivalence is more nuanced. Reciprocity may establish that the foreign legal system is, in principle, open to Belarusian judgments, while the requested court still has to examine the individual judgment against its jurisdictional, procedural and public-policy standards.

 This is also why current geopolitical relations should not be substituted for legal analysis. Political disagreement between states does not, by itself, answer the private-international-law question. Similarly, the absence of political agreement does not by itself prove that a particular court will refuse a judgment. The decisive inquiry remains the law applicable in the requested jurisdiction, including any sanctions, public-policy rules, procedural restrictions or treaty obligations that are actually relevant to the judgment and enforcement measure in question. The more precise approach is to identify the legal rule, the type of judgment, the available evidence of reciprocal treatment, and the specific grounds on which the requested court may refuse recognition.

 The principle of reciprocity occupies an important but carefully limited position in the law governing recognition of judgments of the courts of the Republic of Belarus by foreign courts. Its significance arises from the territorial nature of judicial authority: a Belarusian judgment cannot automatically command enforcement in another sovereign legal order. Some legal basis is required in the state in which effect is sought. The current Belarusian Code of Civil Procedure provides a clear domestic framework. Article 527 recognises legislation, international treaties and reciprocity as possible bases for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, while the Code's broader provisions require attention to treaty priority and the principles governing proceedings involving foreign persons [1]. Chapter 51 then establishes the procedure for applications, the three-year period for compulsory enforcement, the judicial hearing, the grounds for refusal and the subsequent enforcement mechanism [1]. Recognition remains a form of legal control rather than a retrial on the merits.

 The comparative material demonstrates that foreign legal systems assign very different roles to reciprocity. Arizona uses reciprocity within a statutory recognition regime, Minnesota's filing mechanism does not make it an express statutory condition, and England and Wales distinguish reciprocal statutory registration from common-law enforcement, where reciprocity is not generally required [4; 5; 6–7]. The central conclusion is therefore that reciprocity should neither be overstated nor disregarded. It is not a universal principle that automatically guarantees the recognition of a Belarusian judgment abroad, nor is it the only possible mechanism for cross-border judicial cooperation. Its legal effect is determined by the law of the requested state and by any applicable international instrument. In some jurisdictions it is a mandatory statutory condition; in others it is absent or only indirectly relevant. For practice, the decisive task is to move from the abstract question of whether reciprocity exists to the concrete question of which legal mechanism is applicable to the particular Belarusian judgment. A careful assessment should identify the judgment's subject matter, the requested state's legal framework, applicable treaties, any reciprocity requirement, and the independent criteria of jurisdiction, finality, procedural fairness and public policy. This approach reflects the current state of international civil procedure more accurately than a simple assumption of legal symmetry between states.

 Reciprocity therefore remains an important residual instrument of private international law, but its contemporary role is functional rather than absolute: it enables cross-border judicial cooperation when a more specific legal basis does not already regulate the relationship. The effectiveness of a Belarusian judgment abroad ultimately depends not on reciprocity in the abstract, but on the concrete recognition rules of the foreign legal system in which enforcement is sought.